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Introduction 
The Children’s Bill currently being drafted seeks to reform the law and 
practice of youth justice in Mauritius. One question that may arise in the 
process is whether, and if so how, Mauritius might learn from the practice 
of other jurisdictions. In this article I seek to reflect upon some of the 
challenges of deriving policy lessons from comparative studies of youth 
justice by reflecting upon the implications of an empirical project 
comparing the practice of youth justice in Italy and England and Wales. 
The study was conducted in collaboration with Professor David Nelken2 
and was based partly on comparing a matched sample of case-files and 
partly on matched interviews with practitioners from each jurisdiction. 
Interviewees were asked not just to reflect on their practice in general but 
also to consider how they would deal with particular fact-circumstances 
set out in vignettes adapted from real cases).3 I will draw from the study 
a picture of the contrasting outcomes in youth justice that emerged, offer 
some explanations for those contrasting outcomes, before examining the 
implications for our capacity to borrow legal solutions from other 
jurisdictions.  
Contrasting systems 
The decision to compare these two jurisdictions was prompted by the fact 
that they seemed in the 1990s and 2000s to be heading off in 
diametrically opposed policy directions. In particular, attitudes to the 
desirability of active and early intervention in response to youth offending 
through the criminal justice system were very different. In England and 
Wales, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 had introduced what became 
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known as the ‘new’ youth justice overtly based on a strategy of early and 
progressive state intervention through the criminal justice system. Yet in 
1988 a Presidential decree (448/1988) had explicitly entrenched into the 
Italian Youth Justice Code assumptions about the need to limit as much 
as possible the use of punishment through criminal process. So there 
seemed to be striking differences in policy direction that were worth 
examining.  
 
This contrast in approach was clearly reflected in very different outcomes. 
Compared with England and Wales, young people in Italy in the 1990s 
and 2000s who came to the notice of authorities for committing criminal 
acts were much less likely to be convicted and sentenced. In Italy, of 
every 100 such youths, less than 20 would leave the system with a 
criminal conviction. In England and Wales, the comparable figure was 55-
60. Italian youths were also much less likely to find themselves in 
custody: of youths aged between 12 and 17, around 50 per 100,000 were 
in custody in England and Wales while in Italy the figure was around 15. 
Even more strikingly, in England and Wales around a third of young 
people convicted would be subject to a sentence involving some kind of 
compulsory intervention in the community. In Italy this hardly ever 
happened.  
 
These contrasting results flowed most obviously and immediately from a 
different rule and policy framework. In England and Wales, the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 not only reduced the age of criminal responsibility to 
10 but introduced a new reprimand and final warning scheme which 
meant that offenders would usually be reprimanded for a first offence, but 
some kind of formal intervention was required for a second offence 
followed by charge and conviction for a third. From then on, in practice 
each time the offender re-offended, the penal intervention in the 
community would normally become more intense and/or prolonged. 
Interventions in the community generally involved control and support 
delivered by newly-created multi-disciplinary Youth Offending Teams with 
a primary statutory duty of reducing offending (rather than the broader 
welfare of the young person). Many offenders followed an almost 
conventional step-by-step path through increasing levels of social 
intervention in the community (even for relatively low-level offending). If 
the most intensive of these failed – the offender came back to court again 
- a custodial sentence became the likely outcome.  
 
In contrast, decision-making in Italy was much less structured by policy 
guidelines: youth justice magistrates made decisions mainly on the basis 
of individualized and discretionary assessment of the risk of continuing 
criminality. In most cases magistrates concluded that routine crime was 
not serious enough to warrant intervention or that a judicial pardon was 
appropriate because the defendant showed no signs of entrenched 
patterns of offending. This led to diversion without any social intervention 
through the criminal process. But in a minority of cases (around 6-8%), 
where offending was more serious or there was a significant previous 
record, if social services identified a prospect of rehabilitation, messa alla 
prove was the usual response.  This involved the judge suspending the 
criminal prosecution - usually at a preliminary hearing but sometimes at 
trial - where the young person admitted his or her involvement in an 
offence. This suspension allowed a period of supervision by social 
workers. During this, the young person might be required to undergo 
education or training, follow voluntary or activity programmes, accept 
restrictions such as staying in at night or avoiding certain places and 
perhaps make some reparative act. If the magistrate concluded at the 
end of the period of suspension that prosecution was not necessary – 
they did so in over 70% of cases – it would be terminated. This response, 
although it involves no conviction, could be imposed for virtually any 
crime: some magistrates interviewed suggested that certain offences such 
as homicide and rape were too serious for messa alla prova but many did 
not accept any limit by crime seriousness. There are many instances of its 
imposition for certain forms of homicide, rape and robbery. But certain 
kinds of offenders tended to be seen as beyond hope: immigrants, 
gypsies and those from criminal families or with organized crime 
connections. The authorities explained this in terms of the inability to 
organise intervention programmes without a (law-abiding) home base. 
For these categories conviction and custody were common disposals.  
 
Explaining difference 
How to explain these profound differences? We can see that, at the heart 
of differences between the systems are different views written both into 
underlying policy and particular decision-making as to the value of social 
intervention through the criminal process. In England and Wales, there 
was structurally inscribed presumption that most young persons required 
a graded application of increasing levels of such  intervention. A failure to 
punish contributed to youth crime because, without early intervention, 
vulnerable young people would not develop a sense of personal 
responsibility. For this, the criminal process, with its moral accent on 
blame and shame, was essential. In Italy, the central aim of youth justice 
was also to responsibilize young people. But, there was a much clearer 
sorting process between offenders: for the vast majority such intervention 
was unnecessary or damaging, a few needed the social intervention of 
messa alla prove, and for some it would be a waste of time. Educative 
measures might sometimes be necessary, but the emphasis was on not 
interrupting or interfering with the normal processes of education and 
psychological and social development taken to be already in place. In 
particular, incarceration and the resulting separation from the socializing 
and educative effect of the family and community were taken to have 
especially negative effects.  
 
Thus, at one level one can explain difference between the two 
jurisdictions simply in terms of the applicable legal and administrative 
rules and underpinning policy choices. Yet we discovered that the 
explanations were also to be found in established institutional elements 
and cultural contexts in the two jurisdictions which seemed to support 
those contrasting rules and policies. In short there seemed to be a logical 
‘fit’ between rule and policy and surrounding criminal justice institutions 
and broader social contexts. This, I will argue later, has important 
implications for ‘learning from elsewhere’ in youth justice. 
 
The first key institutional difference was in the relationship between pre-
trial and trial phases which was in turn the consequence of differences in 
the ‘pace’ of throughput in youth justice. In Italy, delay is an established 
element of legal culture. Judges cited 2-3 years as the normal time period 
between offence and public hearing. A young person arrested at 14 may 
be very different in their personality, aspirations and family contexts 
when finally sentenced at 16 or 17. It is hardly surprising that, if a youth 
justice system with these levels of delays sees a need for intervention, it 
should prefer action before rather than after conviction. Thus, delay 
becomes part of the institutional context in Italy that promotes pre-trial 
rather than post-conviction intervention. This is not just the use of messa 
alla prove from the preliminary hearing. It also entailed the use of 
restrictive pre-trial measures that were used as interventions in the sense 
of responses intended to reduce further offending. In the case of very 
serious crime, especially that which involved the Mafia or foreign youths, 
this might well involve remand in custody. But for most youths and for 
more routine offences, this will involve the use of a range of pre-trial 
measures involving increasing degrees of control in the community: 
young people might be required to study or work for a period, to stay at 
home or in another specified place or to live in a special residential 
community. In part, these might be used for the same reasons as bail 
conditions in other jurisdictions: preventing flight, further offending or 
interference with witnesses or evidence. But the terms in which such pre-
trial measures were discussed by magistrates was more often couched in 
terms of responses to established or presumed offending. Such measures 
were frequently presented as rehabilitative or re-educative or 
responsibilizing in their aim.  
 
Another key institutional distinction between Italy and England and Wales 
is in the way relations between civil and criminal state intervention are 
constructed. In Wales, Family courts and Youth (criminal justice) courts 
are formally separated. Youth social services work with Family courts and 
have the primary statutory aim of addressing the interests and welfare 
needs of children and young persons. Youth Offending Teams (YOTS) 
work with the youth courts with the primary statutory of preventing 
offending. But the distribution of intervention between civil and criminal 
jurisdictions was shaped by the fact that YOTs were widely perceived to 
have superior resourcing and to be more effective institutions than youth 
social services. Thus, unless there was an accommodation or child 
protection issue, social services, faced with limited resources, often 
sought to pass the provision of welfare services onto the YOTs for any YPs 
involved in offending even where the link between need and offending 
was not obvious. So the availability of resources and the demands of 
national standards meant services that might have been delivered by 
non-criminal agencies were delivered by YOTs so that they became 
primary deliverers of welfare needs. This is completely the reverse of the 
situation in Italy where local social services when responding to what are 
essentially problems of offending have to define those problems as 
welfare problems because the local state does not have jurisdiction over 
crime. Thus, in the delivery of services, there is a logic to ‘talking down’ 
crime in Italy and ‘talking up’ crime in Britain. Furthermore, Italian 
prosecutors and juvenile judges have co-ordinate civil and criminal 
jurisdiction. Prosecutors can define an event as non-criminal but ensure 
state intervention takes place through social work intervention through 
the civil courts. Indeed, often civil intervention is quicker than waiting to 
put a messa alla prove in place. Italian pre-trial judges can ensure civil 
interventions are taking place alongside preliminary criminal 
investigations. Now there are very real resource constraints as to what 
can be done: Italy is by no means a country with wide-ranging state 
welfare interventions. But there was none of the feeling in our interviews 
in Wales that the criminal side is so much better resourced and organized 
that effective social intervention is better done through the criminal 
process.  
 
The empirical data also revealed clear differences in established 
occupational cultures and relationships. In Italy, youth justice is primarily 
controlled by professional specialist youth justice magistrates. These 
magistrates had chosen to work with children in a jurisdiction that 
embraces both civil and penal intervention and their self-image is 
constructed in terms of welfare and education. They have clear legal 
powers to direct social workers and police officers in pre-trial investigation 
and wide-ranging constitutional judicial independence to resist any 
punitive pressures from politicians and public opinion. Roles and 
relationships were very differently constructed in England and Wales. 
First, youth justice magistrates are not the dominant actors that they are 
in Italy. Furthermore, youth justice magistrates in England and Wales are 
lay magistrates. In our interviews, many magistrates were quite clear 
that their function was in part to reflect the opinions of the communities 
that they in some sense ‘represented’. And for those magistrates, that 
local public opinion would not allow them to pursue a less punitive or 
more diversionary policy.  
 
Even beyond the youth justice system there were key differences in the 
cultural contexts, in family and community. Levels of supervision and 
informal social controls through the extended family and school were seen 
in Italy as sufficient for most families to be trusted by the system with 
responding to most troubling youths. Admittedly this thinking was not 
applied to particular social categories (essentially immigrants, gypsies and 
organised crime families). But magistrates in Wales were forceful and 
more general in their view that the ‘collapse of the family’ meant the 
solution of problems could not be left to parents.  
 
Implications for learning from elsewhere 
 
What can we learn from bilateral comparisons like this about policy 
choices in youth justice? One approach to reform is to seek to frame the 
question in a way that removes (or perhaps disguises) the underlying 
value judgements, as being about efficiently and effectively reducing 
youth crime? What works? What works elsewhere? Can it be applied 
here? But typically, it will be difficult to provide convincing empirical 
evidence that one system works better than another in reducing youth 
crime. Not least of the problems is that the two systems under 
examination do not measure youth crime in the same way: Italy records 
the number of offences by youths reported to the prosecutor whereas 
England and Wales uses central data on pre-court disposals and 
convictions. We can guess that youth crime in Italy was probably lower 
over the relevant period because the numbers for relevant crime are so 
different. But we do not know how far that is a product of the superior 
response of the youth justice system or in differences in broader social 
factors affecting levels of youth crime. And we cannot compare 
reconviction rates for various social interventions to see which ‘reduce’ 
offending the most because they are not systematically recorded in Italy. 
 A broader way of looking at youth justice policy-making is to see it 
as choosing the priority accorded to, and the relationship between, two 
linked but separable social objectives. The first, promoting the social 
integration (or limiting the social exclusion) of troubled children and 
young people, defines the problem in broad social terms. The second, 
preventing or reducing youth crime through criminal justice sanctions 
defines it much more narrowly. Do we see young people as children first 
and offenders second or do we choose to govern troubled youth through 
criminal justice? Now these are fundamental moral and then political 
choices which turn on much broader questions than youth justice. What 
kind of society do we want? They also reflect matters of national or social 
identity: what kind of people are we? Comparative research may have a 
value in illustrating the range of possible blends between these two 
objectives but making these choices may be as much about national 
identity and overarching visions of society as evidence-based policy 
construction.  
How far can this study assist in these judgements? What we have 
done is use empirical data to develop a complex detailed explanation of 
differences in practices in Wales and Italy. This explanation showed the 
many ways in which policy, institutional relationships and broader cultural 
contexts all supported early formal intervention through criminal justice 
system within the youth justice in England Wales and diversion into 
Italian youth justice in Italy. We were able to show how and why penal 
non-intervention fitted the ‘youth justice culture’ in Italy: we have set out 
a set of interrelationships which seem to make it not just possible, but 
indeed perhaps logical, to avoid intervention, which gives coherence to 
non-intervention as a response. Some British academics and pressure 
groups, concerned about the high rates of criminalization and 
incarceration of young people under the ‘new youth justice’ in England 
and Wales, have seen Italy as a preferable, more tolerant response to 
youth crime that limits stigmatizing exclusion of criminal justice. They 
wanted to see a shift in balance away from targeted criminal justice 
interventions against troubling youth to more general support for troubled 
youth outside the criminal justice system. But this never went very far as 
an argument towards adopting an Italian model. Our research surely 
suggests why. Italian practice has a number of features that would 
require ‘cultural revolution’ in England and Wales in that they require a 
certain trust in an active judiciary: a professional specialist youth justice 
magistrate directing trial and pre-trial with a high degree of discretion in 
practice, a mixed civil and criminal jurisdiction and the use of controlling 
and supporting interventions in the pre-trial process before conviction. 
This ‘fits’ the political and social traditions and institutions of Italy but 
would be politically problematic because institutionally revolutionary in 
England and Wales.  Attempting to reduce offending through the use of 
judicial pre-trial control and social interventions through the criminal 
justice system would be considered contrary to the presumption of 
innocence if directed at those not (yet) convicted of crime. A system that 
combined use of civil and criminal sanctions was abandoned in the 1960s 
in England and Wales because of the fear that welfare interventions might 
be used for controlling or coercive purposes. The use of control or 
coercion must be subject to the distinct safeguards of the criminal justice 
system. Both of these constraints express a certain distrust of the state 
and need for adversarial due process to contain the coercive power of the 
state. And we can argue that the absence of a dominant figure like the 
Italian pre-trial youth justice magistrate is not an accident in England and 
Wales. The coordinate structure of lay magistrate, police and social 
workers is characteristic of a tradition in criminal justice characteristic of 
Anglo-saxon liberal adversarial jurisdictions. The absence of clear 
hierarchical relationships reflects the historic desire to divide and contain 
power. These relationships do not not just reflect what particular 
Governments think of as the most effective way of responding to youth 
crime, this is a form of organisation that reflects entrenched elements of 
political culture and history. Introducing a specialist professional pre-trial 
youth magistrate trained in law and in youth development with the power 
to direct police and social workers and to use civil and criminal powers to 
both promote welfare and maintain social order, might look to some like a 
way of combining a concern for welfare with one for due process. But to 
many in England and Wales, of left and of right, this might be seen as 
putting a lot of trust in a single judicial figure where the guarantees are 
written into the function and occupational culture of the officeholder 
rather than the constraints of procedure. Building such an occupational 
culture from scratch within the context of English traditions would be a 
challenging and risky enterprise that few Governments would contemplate 
in the face of likely opposition seeking to protect the independent power 
of the police and the lay magistrate.  
It is hard to see how ‘learning’ from Italy could be done in less 
radical mode. The systems are so different that transplanting a particular 
part taken from one system to the other poses obvious risks of rejection 
(just as an organ from one body may be rejected when transplanted into 
another). So one possible conclusion for Mauritius, is that if you are 
looking to make particular policy adjustments while maintaining the 
underlying political and cultural assumptions of a system, then 
appropriate comparators are likely to be places with similar fundamentals 
but particular differences so that you can better assess the utility of those 
particular elements.  
What is the use then of more radical comparisons such as the one 
conducted in this bilateral study? What it may do is enable the creative 
challenging of deep rooted and apparently established wisdoms. For 
example, one can see the conflict between Italian youth justice and the 
‘new justice’ of the 1990s and 2000s as a debate between radically 
different approaches to the concept of ‘responsibilization.’ In one, 
responsibilization is associated with a moment of public blaming, shaming 
and paining at criminal trial. In the other, responsibilization is a broader 
life-long process of socialisation principally carried out through the family 
and community but to which educative contact with the state may 
contribute. The Italian system provides an example of a system - a 
functioning system in the context of native Italian youth - that 
responsibilizes without primary emphasis on conviction and punishment. 
When asked how responsibilization occurs in a system where young 
people are often not convicted for even serious offences, Italian 
magistrates argued that it was the educative contact with the justice 
system (the message coming from social workers and magistrates) that 
was critical rather than a public ritual of shaming and paining. The precise 
way in which this is done in Italy could not be easily reproduced in 
England and Wales. But the fact that it can be done provides evidence 
that alternative organising concepts are possible involving different 
visions of the good society and the political relationship between state 
and individual.  
 
 
 
